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This thesis explores if the energy strategy of the Hashemite Kingdom of 
Jordan, as formulated and executed by the Ministry of Energy and Mineral 
Resources, will help the country achieve greater energy security. This work 
qualitatively analyzes the progress in each energy subsector—hydrocarbons, nuclear 
power, and renewables—on goals presented in the country’s strategy, and provides 
further analysis to determine each subsector’s potential to play a greater role in 
future energy development. The primary conclusion is that the goals within Jordan’s 
overarching energy strategy have not been realized and, consequently, the strategy is 
not on track to provide energy security. This conclusion is based on three main 
findings. First, Jordan failed in meeting targets to diversify and exploit domestic 
hydrocarbon resources—being forced to rely on foreign heavy fuels and running a 
deficit to meet basic energy needs. Second, the kingdom’s nuclear program has not 
kept up with development milestones and further nuclear progress is hampered 
by significant political and resource constraints. Third, the administration in 
Amman has been unsuccessful in fully capitalizing on the abundance of renewable 
energy resources readily available within Jordan’s borders. 
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A. RESEARCH QUESTION 
Over the years, Jordan has emerged as an important U.S. ally in the Middle East. 
In contrast to most nations of the region, Jordan has been without the abundance of 
hydrocarbons synonymous with neighboring countries like Syria, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia. 
This leaves Jordan without reliable, affordable domestic sources of energy—instead 
leaving it severely dependent as a net energy importer. Jordan has established an 
overarching energy plan in the hopes of reducing its dependence on imported energy and 
improving its energy security. Within the plan, nuclear development, renewable 
expansion, and hydrocarbon diversification are identified as potential areas for Jordan to 
expand domestic energy production and create more energy independence. Considering 
the strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats associated with each energy 
source, will Jordan's energy strategy meet its future needs and help the country achieve 
greater energy security? 
B. RELEVANCE 
Despite being in a region where the abundance of natural resources seems 
congruent with the focus of U.S. foreign policy interest, Jordan remains important to the 
United States for its roles as a regional ally, perpetuator of moderate ideology, and status 
as a bastion of relative stability within the Middle East.1 While Jordan took up arms 
against U.S.-allied Israel from the Arab-Israeli War of 1948 to the 1973 Yom Kippur 
War, Jordan’s government has rebounded toward seeking peace as tendered in the 1994 
agreement with Israel.2 In this agreement, Jordan relinquished claims to the West Bank, 
but continues to play an important role overseeing important Muslim holy sites within 
Israel—most notably the Al-Aqsa Mosque resting on the Temple Mount.3 Since taking 
                                                 
1 Jeremy M. Sharp, “Jordan: Background and U.S. Relations” (Washington, DC: Congressional 




power in 1999, King Abdullah has continued cooperation with Israel and compliance 
with U.S. calls for support. Jordan’s most apparent demonstration of this support has 
taken place in its operations combatting the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS). 
Since the start of airstrikes in August 2014, Jordan has claimed responsibility for one-
fifth of the air attacks conducted by coalition forces in Operation Inherent Resolve.4 
Moreover, U.S. and other coalition military personnel maintain presence in Jordan 
operating Patriot missile batteries and fighter aircraft.5 
As conflict continues between Israel and militant groups in Gaza, Syria erupts in 
Civil War, and Iraq deals with territorial advances by the ISIS, Jordan provides relative 
safety and security for refugees flooding in from troubled areas of the Middle East. To 
date, there are approximately two million registered Palestinian refugees in Jordan.6 
Jordanian citizens originally from Palestine also make up between 55 and 70% of the 
total population.7 From 2012 to 2015, over 600,000 Syrians sought refuge in Jordan from 
that nations ongoing civil war—raising the total population by 10%.8 This rising influx of 
refugees has dramatically increased economic and political strain on the government in 
Amman.9  
Limited supply resulting from chaotic regional events, paired with the increasing 
domestic demand, leaves Jordan’s government struggling to ensure affordable and 
reliable access to food, water, and energy. At the crux of this problem is a high 
dependence on foreign hydrocarbons to provide the basic energy needs of the rising 
population while attempting to develop a more robust domestic economy. Jordan stands 
as one of the most dependent nations from an energy perspective, regularly importing 
over 95% of its domestic energy requirements—nearly 20% of its gross domestic 
                                                 
4 Ibid. 
5 Ibid., 3. 
6 Ibid., 4. 
7 Ibid., 6–7. 
8 Ibid., 3. 
9 Ibid., 3–7. 
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product.10 In the last decade, the Middle East’s instability has forced Jordan to pivot its 
hydrocarbon imports from Iraq to Egypt to Saudi Arabia, and now toward Israel for 
reliable energy supplies. Maintaining an affordable, reliable supply of energy is important 
for sustaining Jordan’s internal stability. After all, the government’s power hinges largely 
on its ability to provide for its swelling population. Without the guiding hand of the U.S.-
aligned Hashemite family, Jordan might succumb to growing anti-Western, Islamist 
ideologies within its population. Such an outcome could strip the U.S. of an important 
Middle East ally, deny refuge to many displaced persons, and remove the nation’s 
position as a buffer among more adversarial regional actors. Thus, considering Jordan’s 
policies toward energy security is a matter of significant U.S. and regional interest. 
C. CONCEPTUAL ORIENTATION 
In light of the essential implications of energy security in Jordan, it is important 
next to consider the energy sustainability trilemma within which energy security exists. 
On the first axis, energy security focuses on what the World Energy Council defines as 
“the effective management of primary energy supply from domestic and external sources, 
the reliability of energy infrastructure, and the ability of energy providers to meet current 
and future demand.”11 Meanwhile, energy equity, defined by the council as “accessibility 
and affordability of energy supply across the population,” is captured on the second 
axis.12 Finally, the third axis of the trilemma focuses on environmental sustainability. 
According to the World Energy Council, environmental sustainability “encompasses the 
achievement of supply and demand side energy efficiencies and the development of 
energy supply from renewable and other low-carbon sources.”13 In further considering  
 
 
                                                 
10 Fareedon Hartoqa, “Jordan: Renewable Energy Market,” Government (U.S. Commercial Service, 
Department of Commerce, May 15), 
http://export.gov/jordan/static/Jordan%20Renewable%20Energy%20Market_Latest_eg_jo_034925.doc. 





the interaction among these axes, it becomes obvious that progress cannot be made on all 
three dimensions simultaneously. After all, any action in one dimension is bound to have 
adverse effects on another. For instance, expanding solar energy might prove useful for 
enhancing energy security and environmental sustainability axes, but investment in 
photovoltaic panels and necessary infrastructure would make energy less affordable.14 
The competing nature of energy security, energy equity, and environmental 
sustainability are readily observable in the representation of Jordan’s energy landscape in 
Figure 1. On one hand, Jordan’s energy equity axis has held fairly strong ratings since 
World Energy Council scoring began in 2011. This reflects each Jordanians’ ample 
access to reasonably affordable energy supplies when compared to other countries 
throughout the world. On the other hand, Jordan’s energy security and environmental 
sustainability were rated rather poorly when scoring started. By 2015, Jordan gained 
ground in environmental sustainability relative to the rest of the world, advancing to 
ninetieth from one hundred-twelfth in 2011.15 Yet, the country sacrificed ground in its 
relative energy security and energy equity. The affordability and access represented in the 
energy equity measure weakened from the fifty-fifth spot to the sixtieth between 2011 
and 2015.16 Moreover, the kingdom’s ranking in the energy security dimension dropped 
from one hundred-seventh to one hundred-thirteenth from 2011 to 2015.17 The key 
takeaway here is that Jordan’s energy security, along with its energy equity, suffered at 





                                                 
14 Robert Looney, email message to author, December 4, 2015. 






Figure 1.  Energy Sustainability Balance in Jordan 
 
Adapted from: “Energy Trilemma Index: Jordan,” World Energy Council, 2015, 
https://www.worldenergy.org/data/trilemma-index/country/jordan/. 
D. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Examining Jordan’s energy security must, of course, start with the present works 
covering the crux of the research question: the current policy driving the Jordanian 
government in its energy pursuits. It seems sensible to start this analysis with the core 
strategic document outlining Jordan’s energy strategy. This document is the Updated 
Master Strategy of Energy Sector in Jordan for the period 2007–2020, hereafter referred 
to as the Master Energy Strategy.19 The completion of this document was undertaken by 
three subcommittees and overseen by Prince Hamza Ibn Al Hussein to “confront the 
challenges…which meet the Kingdom’s energy needs...in a way that would contribute to 
improving the level of availability and openness of [the] energy market before 
investments and achieving…energy supply security.”20 The subcommittees consisted of 
the following: the oil, electricity, and natural gas sector; the energy conservation and 
                                                 
19 “Updated Master Strategy of Energy Sector in Jordan for the Period 2007–2020” (Ministry of 
Energy and Mineral Resources, Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, December 2007), 
http://www.memr.gov.jo/Portals/0/energystrategy.pdf. 
20 Ibid., 2. 
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alternative energy sector—consisting of all non-carbon based energy sources; and the 
local energy sector.21  
Throughout the Master Energy Strategy, one can see the relatively high 
importance placed on hydrocarbons given the obvious dominance of oil and gas 
recommendation presented by the oil, electricity, and natural gas sector as well as the 
local energy sector. While such focus seems sensible considering the historical 
prominence of hydrocarbon fuels, the initial setup of the committees seems to preclude 
significant consideration of energy sources aside from natural gas or oil. Still, Jordan’s 
strategy seeks limited diversification of its energy as gleaned by its intended shift from its 
2007 mix to benchmarks laid out for the years of 2012, 2015, and 2020.22 Jordan’s 
strategy sought to reduce its oil from 57% in 2007 to 40% in 2020.23 It seems Jordan 
intended to use natural gas as a bridge fuel considering it projected a rise in usage from 
34% to 43% between 2007 and 2012 before being reduced to 37% in 2015, and 29% in 
2020.24 Jordan foresees the share of imported electricity continuously dropping from 8% 
in 2007 to only 1% in 2020.25 To make up for reductions in other areas, Jordan projected 
shale oil to contribute 7% of total energy by 2015 and 14% by 2020.26 The Master 
Energy Strategy also envisaged a continual increase in renewable energy sources from 
1% in 2007 to 10% by 2020.27 In sum, Jordan expected to reduce its foreign dependency 
from 96% in 2007 to just 75% in 2020. Although, these figures must be considered in the 
context of the documents further projections that Jordan’s energy growth will progress at 
a modest 6.2% from 2007 to 2020.28 The document’s benchmarks show that Jordan 
intends to seek greater energy independence from foreign markets, but exploitation of 
shale oil reserves will create a net increase in the share of carbon-based fuels expected in 
                                                 
21 Ibid. 






28 Ibid., 8. 
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the future energy mix. Thus, Jordan seeks a minimal diversification among its types of 
energies and hopes to experience a greater overarching share of domestic production.  
There is support for continuing heavy reliance on oil and natural gas, especially 
considering the revolution in unconventional extraction methods that has made utilization 
of shale oil and shale gas a reality. For instance, a 2013 article by David Schenker and 
Simon Henderson of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy discussed Jordan’s 
plans to build a pipeline from Basra to the Port of Aqaba, revitalizing an oil pipeline from 
Saudi Arabia, tapping Iraqi and Qatari natural gas, and seeking a natural gas deal with 
Israel.29 Sultan Barakat and Andrew Leber of the Brookings Institution see domestic 
extraction of oil shale as more preferential for the kingdom’s internal political stability 
than foreign gas deals, especially one with Israel.30 While these examples are proponents 
of Jordan’s policies to continue heavy use of natural gas and petroleum products, there 
are some who see other options as being more viable.31 
Adoption of nuclear power is hotly disputed issue both within Jordanian domestic 
politics and within the international community. The Jordanian Atomic Energy 
commission sees many boons of atomic energy, including: reduction in dependency  
on hydrocarbons, more affordable electricity, greater consistency of supply, prevalence  
of available domestic uranium reserves, potential for export of uranium, and creation  
of jobs in multiple related industries.32 Of course, the commission also admits that  
there are major challenges like financial support, waste management, human resource 
development, and uranium extraction.33 Given the high regularity of nuclear power, 
                                                 
29 Simon Henderson and David Schenker, “Eastern Mediterranean Natural Gas and Jordan’s Energy 
Options,” The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, March 11, 2013, 
http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/eastern-mediterranean-natural-gas-and-jordans-
energy-options. 
30 Sultan Barakat and Andrew Leber, “Fortress Jordan: Putting the Money to Work,” Policy Briefing 




32 “Benefits for Jordan,” Jordan Atomic Energy Commission, 2011, 
http://www.jaec.gov.jo/WhyNuclear/BenefitsForJordan.aspx. 
33 “Challenges,” Jordan Atomic Energy Commission, 2011, 
http://www.jaec.gov.jo/JordanNuclearProgram/Challenges.aspx. 
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Jordan sees it as a means of providing an electricity base load to support greater 
economic development and desalinization—leveraging energy against the shortage of 
free enterprise and freshwater. 34 
There are several sources of opposition overlooked by the Jordanian Atomic 
Energy commission, which have been brought up by in a separate product by David 
Schenker and Simon Henderson.35 Internationally, the pair highlights the vocal political 
opposition from both the United States and Israel. Domestically, its seems the high cost 
of the two proposed plants, potential for terrorist threats, environmental concerns, and 
safety concerns are among the major sticking points. Jordanians have conducted planned 
demonstrations against the proposed nuclear plants and parliament had previously 
suspended progress on the plants in 2012.36  
Nicolas Seeley agrees that nuclear energy has the potential to help Jordan 
overcome some of its water and energy problems, but goes into further detail on the 
country’s domestic political rhetoric.37 He presents views from the Jordan Friends of the 
Environment organization, which argue that published budgetary estimates overlook 
insurance, loan interest, nuclear waste disposal, and the financial burden of mothballing 
plants in later years. Seeley highlights views from Jordanian parliamentarians, ‘Atif 
Kawwar, Jamal Gammoh, and Hind al-Fayiz, who do not think nuclear power is right for 
Jordan. Kawwar thinks that oil shale, natural gas, and renewables would provide more 
immediate, cost-effective answers to Jordan’s energy needs, but the nuclear lobby is 
keeping them from happening. Seeley also presents history of dissent within Jordan 
Atomic Energy Commission between the current chairman, Khalid Toukan, and former 
commissioners of the nuclear fuel cycle and site selection. Originally charged with 
leading examination of the exploitability of domestic uranium reserves for the atomic fuel 
                                                 
34 “Benefits for Jordan.” 
35 Simon Henderson and David Schenker, “Jordan’s Energy Balancing Act,” The Washington Institute 
for Near East Policy, March 12, 2014, http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/jordans-
energy-balancing-act. 
36 Ibid. 
37 Nicholas Seeley, “The Battle Over Nuclear Jordan,” Middle East Report, MER 271 - Fuel and 
Water, 44, no. Summer 2014 (2014), http://www.merip.org/mer/mer271/battle-over-nuclear-
jordan?ip_login_no_cache=ff712a360bb8af567f1e32d613050536. 
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cycle, Nidal Xoubi voiced concern that concentration of the element within core samples 
was not high enough for economical extraction. This claim was supported when French 
company Areva abandoned its mining and plant construction agreements after measuring 
low concentration of uranium within geological samples. The former commissioner of 
site management, Kamal Khudayr, left in disgust over plans to move the proposed 
nuclear plants location from the Gulf of ‘Aqaba to Qusayr ‘Amr. Seeley also points out 
the apparent permissiveness between the Jordan Atomic Energy Commission and the 
Jordan Nuclear Regulatory Commission considering that Majd Hawwari, the newest 
director of the regulatory commission, is the brother of one of the top five officials in the 
Jordan Atomic Energy Commission.38  
One of the most drastic propositions for changing Jordan’s energy policies—
particularly with regard to shifting toward renewables—is that embodied in Greenpeace’s 
report entitled Jordan’s Future Energy.39 Greenpeace argues that Jordan could achieve 
full energy independence by 2050 through exploiting wind and solar energy alone.40 
Moreover, the report touts Jordan’s technical wind and solar potential as being in excess 
of 60 times projected energy demands through 2050.41 Greenpeace argues this shift to 
renewable sources of energy has the potential to save approximately $12 billion and 
create 30,000 much-needed jobs to help deal with the country’s burgeoning youth 
population and recent influx of refugees.42 The crux of this vision lies in realization of 
technical advances and related cost efficiencies that have not yet been realized. To 
achieve this hypothetical renewable revolution, Greenpeace advocates the gradual 
transition away from using hydrocarbons as fuel and refutes both the cost efficiency and 
operational effectiveness touted by nuclear proponents.43 Greenpeace cites the potential 
discontinuation of gas supplies from Egypt, increasing cost of hydrocarbon electricity 
                                                 
38 Seeley, “Battle Over Nuclear.” 
39 “Jordan’s Future Energy” (Greenpeace Mediterranean, 2013), 1, 
http://www.greenpeace.org/arabic/PageFiles/481146/Jordan_Report2013.pdf. 
40 Ibid. 
41 Ibid., 2. 
42 Ibid., 1. 
43 Ibid., 2. 
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production, national debt, uncertainty regarding domestic shale development, renewable 
grid parity, and likely parity with discounted natural gas-based generation between 2020 
and 2050.44 
A more balanced approach to renewables is embodied within the report titled 
Sustainable Energy Mix and Policy for Jordan, which was a joint venture between the 
Jordanian Royal Scientific Society and the German Freidrich-Ebert-Stiftung.45 The 
document calls for thinking about energy beyond its simple role as a commodity to 
integrate planning of renewables, improve economic efficiency, improve human 
resources, seek new means to apply renewables, recommend policy for transition to 
renewable energy, and promote public consciousness on the potential for renewables.46 
As a call to shift toward renewables, the report highlights the drastic shifts in energy 
prices in the wake of the Arab Spring, the economic impact of supply disruption from 
Egypt, and the associated costs of switching to liquid fuels. Jordan’s efforts to use 
domestic shale oil, develop nuclear power, expand the role of renewables, and improve 
energy efficiency are all lauded as best practices.47 The report generally supports 
Jordan’s overarching strategy to bridge toward renewables by diversifying into all areas 
of energy sources and supplies, but presses renewable energy as an ultimate and 
necessary end state. 
The Royal Scientific Society and Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung also identify several 
important challenges that were not identified or addressed within Jordan’s Master Energy 
Strategy.48 First, is the lack of adequate legislation to encourage renewable energy 
                                                 
44 “Jordan’s Future Energy,” 3–13. 
45 “Vision, Mission and Values,” Royal Scientific Society, 2015, http://www.rss.jo/about-us/vision; 
“About Us,” Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 2015, http://www.fesdc.org/about-us.html. The Royal Scientific 
Society is headquartered in Amman, Jordan with the mission “to build and strengthen scientific and 
engineering research in the areas of greatest strategic value to Jordan’s long-term competitiveness and 
development.” Headquartered in Bonn, Germany, Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung is “ a non-profit German 
political foundation committed to the advancement of public policy issues in the spirit of the basic values of 
social democracy through education, research, and international cooperation. 
46 Mo’tasem Nayef Saeedan, ed., “Sustainable Energy Mix and Policy Framework for Jordan” 
(Amman: Royal Scientific Society and Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, 2011), XVII, http://library.fes.de/pdf-
files/bueros/amman/08883.pdf. 
47 Ibid., 2. 
48 Ibid., 2.; “Master Energy Plan.” 
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development, including: lack of energy efficiency laws, lack of adequate private 
investment incentives, limited availability of finances for small projects within the 
domestic economy, and the relatively high price of renewable energy production.49 
Financing is also highlighted as a major problem for developing a civil nuclear 
program—as is Jordan’s shortage of water, nuclear waste management, human resources 
development, speculation on the quantity of domestic uranium reserves, and political 
opposition.50 While providing support that Jordanian shale oil reserves are high, the 
report concedes the difficulty in accurately assessing reserve quantities, high use of 
scarce water resources, multiple environmental hazards of extraction, byproduct disposal, 
and high extraction and refinement costs as issues that would need to be overcome. 51 
Several more see a balanced and diversified use of Jordan’s domestic energy 
resources as being the road to great security and energy independence. The Oxford 
Business Group contends that combining domestic renewable energy, shale reserves, and 
natural gas in place of vast hydrocarbon imports is the only way to overcome the 
significant challenges facing Jordan’s water and energy shortage.52 Also acknowledging 
the importance of mixed resources, analysis by the World Bank concludes that the most 
important moves for Jordan’s energy security are in the areas of energy sector 
privatization, diversification, and price stability.53 The International Monetary Fund’s 
Andrea Gamba provides projections suggesting the macroeconomic impact of 
diversification into varied energy sources—including liquefied natural gas imports 
through the Gulf of Aqaba, solar, wind, domestic oil shale, and nuclear production—
would be a boon for Jordan’s economy, but that the attractiveness for switching to these 
                                                 
49 Saeedan, “Sustainable Energy Mix,” 42. 
50 Ibid., 51–60. 
51 Ibid., 87. 
52 “Into the Limelight: Reducing Energy Dependence by Tapping into Oil Shale Reserves,” Oxford 
Business Group, accessed June 4, 2015, http://www.oxfordbusinessgroup.com/overview/limelight-
reducing-energy-dependence-tapping-oil-shale-reserves. 
53 “Jordan—Strategic Options for Energy Sector Development : A Policy Note” (The World Bank, 
May 31, 2005), 36, http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2005/05/6644224/jordan-strategic-options-
energy-sector-development-policy-note. 
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sources depends largely on the cost of crude oil.54 Last, but not least, Daniel Yergin’s 
The Quest highlights energy diversification as the simplest means of mitigating energy 
insecurity.55 This is because diversification limits the effects of disruption from a given 
source by offering multiple alternative energy options within the market.56 It seems the 
more diverse Jordan’s energy portfolio is, the more secure its energy will be. 
E. POTENTIAL EXPLANATIONS AND HYPOTHESES 
Three essential issues must be considered to address the research question: first, 
the current energy policy of Jordan; second, determining whether the kingdom’s current 
policy toward energy will adequately address its energy issues; and third, to make 
suggestions for any changes in Jordanian or U.S. policy that could help the country 
achieve greater energy security. 
It is first important to establish Jordan’s collective energy strategy as it stands 
today. At an overarching level, it seems that Jordan’s written policy could be easily 
ascertained in the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan’s energy strategy document. Since the 
most recent version of this document was published in 2007, I propose that there are 
practical deviations from policies as outlined in this document. I further theorize that any 
deviations were made in reaction to the multiple challenges Jordan has faced both 
economically and politically. Taking Jordan’s core policy document at face value leaves 
potential for the researcher to overlook the current policies and legislation being enacted 
to further the nation’s energy security. By overlooking policy changes and legislation 
which has occurred since 2007, one could easily miss any changes made in the wake of 
political turmoil associated with the Arab Spring movement, rise of the Islamic State, and 
the related influx of refugees as well as changes made to address related and unrelated 
economic shifts like the shale revolution in oil and gas production, the fall of petroleum 
54 Andrea Gamba, “New Energy Sources for Jordan: Macroeconomic Impact and Policy 
Considerations,” IMF Working Paper, Working Paper No. 15/115 (Middle East and Central Asia 
Department, International Monetary Fund, May 2015), 5–17, 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2015/wp15115.pdf. 
55 Daniel Yergin, The Quest: Energy, Security, and the Remaking of the Modern World (New York: 
Penguin, 2011), 416. 
56 Ibid., 275.  
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prices, and technological advances affecting the development of alternative energy 
sources. 
The second issue hinges largely on the first issues ability to correctly identify 
Jordan’s current energy policies. From there, research must objectively determine 
whether Jordan’s current energy policies and practices are meeting the current needs of 
the population and whether planned provisions provide an appropriate means to address 
the countries needs going into the future. My hypothesis is that Amman’s current 
measures will not adequately address the challenges facing the kingdom. Of course, this 
determination will not be binary and must express the degree to which Jordan’s policy 
does or does not meet the challenges to gain greater energy security. I base this thought 
on the kingdom’s heavy historical reliance on energy imports, a heavy dependence on 
hydrocarbons, and an apparent lack of action to change the status quo. Jordan lacks the 
capacity to supply enough oil and gas to fuel its economy with the limited domestic 
hydrocarbon resources on hand. Conventional wisdom dictates that having such a high 
dependence on gas and oil without large reserves will leave Jordan without the ability to 
deal with exogenous shocks to energy markets and could leave Jordan in a grave 
situation. While economic interdependence is generally viewed as a positive 
characteristic in the liberal school of international relations theory, such outright 
dependency leaves Jordan in a weakened political and economic state. This dependency 
opens Jordan up to the use of energy as a weapon, making the regime vulnerable to the 
whims of its foreign suppliers. Moreover, the inability to provide affordable and reliable 
domestic energy could create domestic turmoil and political upheaval jeopardizing the 
legitimacy and control of the Hashemite regime. Each of these outcomes creates a 
difficult situation for the U.S. and its interests in the region. 
The final issue rises out of the context of the second. Whether Jordan is deemed 
as having taken appropriate measures to address its energy dilemma, I hypothesize that 
there are a number of areas of improvement that can be taken as points for constructing 
future Jordanian policies toward energy and U.S. policies toward Jordan. Jordan’s 
extreme dependency on foreign energy imports coupled with its growing population and 
influx of refugees call the King’s government to take action. Long dependent on foreign 
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aid and assistance from both the United States and neighboring countries, I further 
propose that Jordan can yet use domestic energy production as a means to further develop 
its economy. I also hypothesized that there are opportunities for Jordan to diversify its 
energy portfolio, which have not been adequately explored by the government in 
Amman. Building a more robust and independent economy is important for dealing with 
Jordan’s high youth population, influx of refugees, and the prevalence of brain drain 
plaguing its society. 
F. RESEARCH DESIGN 
To answer the research question, this thesis seeks to accomplish three main goals: 
first, to identify both the stated and actual energy strategy and policy of the Hashemite 
Kingdom of Jordan; second, to evaluate whether Jordan’s policies are appropriate for 
achieving energy security; and third, to suggest potential policy and actions for enhancing 
Jordanian energy security. 
First, the thesis will use various means to identify Jordan’s energy policy and 
strategy. The most obvious means of identifying Jordan’s energy strategy is through 
review and synthesis of core strategic documents and legislation like those from the 
Jordanian Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources. While written expression of the 
government’s will provides base information on its public intent, it does not necessarily 
provide the whole picture. Thus, identifying Jordan’s unstated policies and willingness to 
take action must be gleaned through the use of scholarly journals and reports like those 
offered from the Middle East Journal and the Brookings Institute. 
In addressing the second and third goals, the effectiveness of Jordan’s stated 
policies must be determined and any areas for potential improvement should be 
identified. To this end, the strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats to Jordan’s 
energy security will be examined as a single case study. Each of the major schools of 
thought regarding Jordan’s energy posture and outlook will be considered. In the 
analysis, these categories will be applied to identify the individual characteristics and 
relative viability of the three overarching categories of energy currently available to 
Jordan: hydrocarbons, nuclear, and renewables. In each category, Jordan’s explicitly 
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stated policies and legislation will be brought to light and considered with regard to the 
economic costs and political implications each type of energy presents for the country. 
Considering these outcomes can shed light on those policies that will be most beneficial 
for Jordan and those that will not. Consequently, conclusions may be drawn regarding 
how U.S. foreign policy toward Jordan and the Middle East should be postured to best 
support Jordan’s energy security and other U.S. interests in the region. The base 
information for these conclusions will be drawn primarily from scholarly research from 
groups like the Washington Institute, analysis by organizations like the International 
Energy Association or private firms like Bloomberg, and information published in news 
or journals like the New York Times and Foreign Policy. 
The study will not include an in-depth discussion of Jordan’s energy policies 
compared to neighboring countries nor will it include a vast amount of detail on other 
sectors of the Jordanian economy. What will be established within the analysis is that 
Jordan lacks the natural resources that have been a boon to its neighbors. What will be 
assumed is that regional unrest combined with adversarial relationships will continue to 
permeate the politics of the Middle East leaving Jordan in a position where it must seek 
independent solutions to its domestic issues. While some countries—like the U.S. or 
Saudi Arabia—might influence Jordan’s policies, the assumption is that no benevolent 
outside actor is going to have the available surplus of resources to solve Jordan’s energy 
problems on its behalf. 
G. THESIS OVERVIEW 
This chapter provided general background and varying views on aspects of 
Jordan’s energy sector. Chapter II of the thesis analyzes hydrocarbons in Jordan, along 
with the potential for both domestic and international expansion in the sector. Chapter III 
discusses the potential of nuclear energy along with the multiple technical and political 
challenges facing Jordan’s Atomic Energy Commission. In Chapter IV, there is dialogue 
on the potential for renewable resources in Jordan. Chapters II, III, and IV consider the 
strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats embodied within each potential source 
of energy. In Chapter V, I link each of the previous chapters to determine the 
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effectiveness of Jordan’s government in seeking energy security while suggesting policy 






Historically, Jordan based a large amount of its energy mix on the employment of 
carbon-based fuels from abroad. Even in recent years, oil and natural gas made up the 
majority of the energy mix—accounting for as much as 98% of total energy supply.57 
Still, the overwhelming share of foreign hydrocarbons are imported into the kingdom  
at a cost of nearly 20% of Jordan’s gross domestic product.58 Most of this recent  
energy supply was derived from Egyptian natural gas and Saudi Arabian oil.59 These 
hydrocarbons kept the Jordanian economy afloat, but with significant internal and 
external costs. Not having ample or abundant access to domestic energy sources, Jordan’s 
use of hydrocarbon energy sources were often discounted by the graces of fellow Arab 
foreign nations like Saddam Hussein’s Iraq and Hosni Mubarak’s Egypt.60 These 
discounts created an unhealthy energy market that stifled domestic economic growth both 
inside and outside the sector. At times, Jordan’s heavy reliance on fossil fuel derivatives 
have left its government indebted from trying to stave off oil market shocks with fuel 
subsidies meant to keep fuels at prices amenable for private and commercial use by 
Jordanian citizenry and businesses. To avoid future shocks, Jordan’s Master Energy Plan 
calls for expansion of domestic oil and natural gas production by appealing to foreign 
investors to undertake exploration and exploitation of the few hydrocarbon resources 
within the country.61 Throughout this section, I contend the Hashemite Kingdom of 
Jordan needs to diversify its sources of fossil fuels and limit their overall contribution to 
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its future energy mix. I come to this conclusion based on the lack of progress and limited 
potential in efforts for domestic expansion. Augmenting this argument is the historical 
costs of relying on foreign hydrocarbons. These costs are readily apparent when 
considering the favorable and unfavorable attributes surrounding Jordan’s main sources 
of energy—petroleum and natural gas. Since solid hydrocarbons—like coal and lignite—
have not been significant sources of energy within the Jordanian mix they will not be 
discussed within this thesis. 
B. AMBITIONS 
First, one must fully consider Jordan’s ambitions with regard to hydrocarbons. 
Jordan expected to reduce the share of its reliance on oil products from 57% in 2007 to 
47% in both 2015 and 2020.62 The Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources also 
recommended large investments in downstream oil operations for expanding Jordan’s 
single oil refinery—both increase its capacity and improve product quality. The ministry 
also called for the refinery company to seek corporate partnership to speed this 
expansion—which included construction of an oil pipeline from the port at Aqaba to the 
Zarqa refinery. Other proposed measures included liberalization of oil and fuel markets, 
improving the competitive environment by ending concessions, implementing anti-trust 
measures, and increasing storage capacity to expand the national strategic reserve.63 
With regard to oil shale, the administration hoped domestic shale deposits could 
be exploited for both oil extraction and electricity generation to crowd out foreign energy 
sources—with contribution rising from nil in 2007 to cover 7% of the total primary 
demand for energy by 2015 and 11% by 2020.64 From a research perspective, Jordan’s 
energy administrators encouraged completion of feasibility studies that were still 
underway in 2007, accomplishment of further studies to determine the effect of oil shale 
utilization on the environment, and establishment of a special oil shale unit to carry out 
these and other related studies. From an operational perspective, the ministry sought to 
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halt concession negotiations with Royal Dutch Shell and focus on agreements for an 
Estonian entity to build, own, and operate a 600 to 900 megawatt oil shale electricity 
generation plant by the end of 2015.65  
On the other hand, Jordan’s bureaucrats saw the use of natural gas rising slightly 
and falling as the country bridged to other energy sources. Natural gas was to rise slightly 
from 34% in 2007 to 37% in 2015 before dropping to just 33% in 2020.66 Toward this 
end, administrators predicted that the country could rely on steady gas supplies from 
Egypt through the Arab Gas Pipeline and that the Risha Gas field would increase 
domestic natural gas extraction to some 340 million cubic feet per day. As far as imports 
were concerned, ministry personnel sought to expand the influx of natural gas from Egypt 
in the near term and were to seek out alternate sources from other nearby countries. As 
for domestic natural gas, bureaucrats recommended the administration seek an agreement 
with a private entity to develop the aforementioned Risha gas field.67 
C. PETROLEUM 
Despite being relatively resource poor, Jordan has long relied on oil to fuel its 
economy. Since its independence in 1946, this liquid hydrocarbon made up the majority 
of the nation’s energy sources—accounting for over 89% of total primary energy supply 
as late as 2012.68 Use of oil-based fuels has persisted for a multitude of reasons. 
Primarily, the state’s geographical placement among oil-rich countries has made 
petroleum products easily accessible for the Jordanian market. As of the end of 2014, 
neighboring Saudi Arabia held over 266 billion barrels of crude oil reserves while 
neighboring Iraq held in excess of 143 billion barrels.69 Together, these immediate 
neighbors hold over 27%of the world’s proven oil reserves while the Middle East region 
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as a whole hold’s over 48%—the equivalent of 803 billion barrels of crude.70 As of 2014, 
Jordan was ranked ninety-eighth in proven oil reserves with an estimated one million 
barrels.71 
Jordan, itself, has limited oil production. Discovered in 1984, the Hamzah Oil 
Field makes up nearly all of the countries petroleum extraction efforts. In recent years, 
the Hamzah Field produced between 20,000 and 25,000 barrels per day.72 This figure is 
only a fraction of the country’s daily consumption of petroleum products—estimated to 
be 122,700 barrels per day.73 The few petroleum product exports from Jordan are 
primarily refined by-products of oil extracted in other countries—mainly Saudi Arabia 
and Iraq. 74 In an effort to enhance its conventional oil extraction, Jordan has enlisted the 
Transeuro Energy Corporation of Canada to further develop the Hamzah Oil Field.75 
Regrettably, lengthy review and approval process by the Jordanian government has kept 
the Canadian company from making any notable improvements upon the oil field’s 
existing production levels. 
D. SHALE 
High world energy prices and a history of energy supply shocks due to regional 
violence and political strife pressed Jordan to seek more domestic solutions for its 
petroleum needs. The rise of shale oil extraction raised hopes that Jordan could leverage 
its underlying shale reserves to help meet future energy demands—spurring notions to 
build a shale oil power plant. 76 Some even suggested the country might become the next 
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Estonia—a country that generates 90% of its power from oil shale.77 The high abundance 
of oil shale deposits within the kingdom attracted interest from companies like Jordan Oil 
Shale Energy Company—a joint venture between Estonian, Jordanian and Malaysian 
firms—and Jordan Oil Shale Company—a subsidiary of Shell Global.78 After all, Jordan 
possesses upwards of 70 billion tonnes of oil shale.79 According to its 2007 energy 
strategy document, Jordan had hoped oil shale would make up 7% of its total energy mix 
by 2015 through both electricity production and petroleum extraction, but has yet to reap 
any practical energy from these tight oil deposits.80 With the high cost of petroleum up to 
2014, these oil shale offered many hopes—having enough margin for profit to be 
commercially viable on the international market. Though, the drop in oil prices in late 
2014 and the high likelihood of Iranian oil hitting a larger cross-section of the world 
market after the lift of economic sanctions do not bode well for shale developments in 
Jordan. Despite the administrations best hopes and continued endeavors, the sustained 
drop in international petroleum prices makes development of domestic shale oil resources 
more troubling and less attractive to foreign companies needed for development and 
investment. 
E. OIL INFRASTRUCTURE 
The kingdom’s high reliance on the Jordan Petroleum Refinery Company and its 
refining capacity make it a critical node—and thus another point of weakness—in 
Jordan’s energy security. After all, the remainder of Jordan’s petroleum sector remains 
largely monopolized by this company. This includes producing, refining, and distributing 
the full spectrum of petroleum products, including fuels, lubricants, hydraulic fluids, and 
other petroleum derivatives.81 The Jordan Petroleum Refinery Company owns and 
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operates a single refinery in Al Zarqa, which lies approximately 22 miles northeast of 
Amman. Through this refinery, Jordan is capable of refining 107,000 barrels of crude per 
day.82 To date, the company has the nation’s only refining capacity having held a 
concessionary contract for a 50-year period up to 2008. An empirical analysis conducted 
by scholars from the University of Jordan and Yarmouk University indicates this refining 
entity held a natural monopoly from 1961 to 2010—the entire span of available data 
when the study was conducted in 2012. Given the status as a natural monopoly the 
market structure could be considered efficient from a cost perspective, but may still be 
inefficient from the perspective of consumers. Thus, Jordan needs to take action to 
regulate the market so that both producer and consumer surplus are maximized. 
Unfortunately, Jordan seems to be forcefully liberalizing the market by making the 
Jordan petroleum Refinery Company create a subsidiary petroleum products distribution 
company to allow entrance of competitive distributors.83  
The lack of operational oil transportation infrastructure is also a weakness. With 
the prevalence of nearby oil supplies one would think transportation of petroleum 
products would be easy and cost effective via pipelines, but Jordan had not been able to 
effectively leverage such infrastructure to tap into supplies from its hydrocarbon-rich 
neighbors. Rather, much of the transportation infrastructure between Jordan and major 
oil-exporting countries is dilapidated and in a state of disrepair. Historically, much of 
Jordan’s oil was imported via the Mosul-Haifa Oil Pipeline and the Trans-Arabian 
Pipeline. The Mosul-Haifa Pipeline begins in Kirkuk extending south and westward 
across Iraq’s Anbar province before entering Jordanian territory where it loosely shadows 
Jordan’s northern border with Syria before crossing into Israeli territory where it 
concludes at the port city of Haifa. Construction on this pipeline was completed under 
British supervision in 1934, but operation ceased during the outbreak of the Arab-Israeli 
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War in 1948.84 The Trans-Arabian Pipeline, commonly referred to as the Tapline, was 
initially operational in 1950 with a former capacity of three million barrels per day.85 
Depicted in Figure 2, the Tapline runs from Al-Dammamm, Saudi Arabia on the Persian 
Gulf crossing Jordan northeast of Amman before crossing Syria and Lebanon where it 
concludes at the Mediterranean Coast in Sidon. Throughout the Tapline’s operation, it 
was plagued by various conflicts between Arab states and Israel. Often being the subject 
of sabotage, the pipeline’s use was largely ceded throughout these conflicts. Use came to 
a decisive end in 1990 when the Saudis cut off supplies to the Zarqa oil refinery due to 
Jordan’s failure to impose economic sanctions against Saddam Hussein’s Iraqi regime 
leading up to first Gulf War.86 Since these pipelines’ closure, the lack of regular 
maintenance has left both lines dilapidated and need of major refurbishments to resume 
transportation of petroleum products. Yet, there has been some consideration to renew 
pipeline shipments since these antiquated lines could permit a projected 40% cost savings 
as an alternative to the current practice of trucking petroleum products overland or 
transiting tankers around the Arabian Peninsula.87  
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Figure 2.  Eastern Mediterranean Energy Infrastructure 
 
The green line with crisscrosses entering Jordan from Saudi Arabia and extending 
through Syria and Israel to Lebanon depicts the Trans-Arabian Pipeline, commonly 
known as the Tapline. The proposed Basra-Aqaba oil and natural gas pipeline is depicted 
as green dashes. The Arab Gas Pipeline is denoted in solid red. Source: “Overview of Oil 
and Natural Gas in the Eastern Mediterranean Region,” Energy Information 
Administration, August 15, 2013, https://www.eia.gov/beta/international/regions-
topics.cfm?RegionTopicID=EM.  
Other proposed pipeline projects promise to bring new infrastructure to replace 
the antiquated lines crossing the Kingdom of Jordan. Jordan’s latest energy plan 
suggested building a pipeline from Aqaba to the Zarqa refinery to enhance supply and 
help offset long-term transportation costs of trucking from the port.88 This proposed 
pipeline has since become part of a larger, $18 billion project agreed upon by the 
governments in Jordan and Iraq to build a pipeline from the Basra oil fields to the port of 
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Aqaba by 2017. The Basra-Aqaba pipeline is partially represented in Figure 1. This 
greater pipeline project is supposed to be comprised of parallel lines for liquid and gas 
products extending over 1,000 miles. The line is anticipated to move one million barrels a 
day—exports via Aqaba are estimated to provide Jordan $3 billion per year and 150,000 
barrels of oil will be diverted for use within the Kingdom. The natural gas line is 
expected to provide Jordan 100 million cubic feet of natural gas per year lending a means 
to supplant dwindling natural gas supplies that were previously provided by Egypt.89 Yet, 
the onslaught of violence stemming from ISIS has already forced Iraq and Jordan to 
consider a new route avoiding ISIS threatened territory in Iraq’s Al-Anbar province.90 
Needless to say, slow progress on important petroleum infrastructure development has 
exacerbated Jordan’s energy problems. 
F. NATURAL GAS 
Natural gas has also played a significant role in Jordan’s energy market. 
Following oil, natural gas held the second-largest share of Jordan’s energy supply 
accounting for almost 9% of the total share of energy.91 As of 2014, Jordan was 
estimated to have just over six billion cubic meters of natural gas reserves—ranking it 
eighty-seventh internationally.92 Like petroleum, natural gas in Jordan is far less 
abundant than other countries in the region considering Middle East holding over 40% of 
the world’s proven natural gas reserves.93 At roughly 1,193, 885, and 288 trillion cubic 
feet, respectively, Iran, Qatar and Saudi Arabia make up the majority of the region’s 
holdings toward the Middle East total of 2,813 trillion cubic feet.94 Jordan’s stated 
strategy called for the country to increase supplies from Egypt and expand its domestic 
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production efforts so that natural gas would make up 37% of its total energy share by 
2015.95 Though, current calculations reveal only a 15% share of the market has been 
achieved—showing the vulnerability of foreign supplies and recent disappointments in 
domestic exploration efforts. 96 These shortcomings also highlight the limited options for 
this sector going into the future. 
As with oil, Jordan has very limited domestic natural gas production. In 2013, 
Jordan’s estimated natural gas production was just over 7.945 billion cubic feet—
approximately 32% of the country’s annual natural gas consumption.97 The Risha Gas 
Field, discovered in 1987, provides the main source of natural gas derived from within 
the kingdom.98 This gas field has averaged 30 million cubic feet since its discovery.99 
Under optimistic notions by the Jordanian government that the field could produce 
upwards of 330 million cubic feet per day, the country had a concessionary agreement 
with British Petroleum in which the company was supposed to invest $237 million into 
development of the field over a four-year period.100 After expending the funds on testing 
and the drilling of two exploration wells, the British company opted to withdraw in early 
2014—finding test results too poor to develop the Risha Gas Field any further.101 
G. NATURAL GAS INFRASTRUCTURE 
The natural gas infrastructure supplying the kingdom is another vulnerability. 
Since 2003, Jordan sourced nearly 80% of its natural gas from Egypt via the Arab Natural 
Gas Pipeline.102 With the annual capability of transporting over 350 billion cubic feet of 
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natural gas to Jordan, this pipeline extends overland from Arish across the Sinai to Taba, 
Egypt on the Red Sea and undersea to the port of Aqaba where the pipeline surfaces and 
extends overland to the north toward Amman before carrying on to Damascus.103 In 
recent years, infrastructure failures due to militant attacks against the Arab Natural Gas 
Pipeline along sections crossing Egypt’s Sinai Peninsula have been a major cause of 
supply disruption—both threatening the kingdom and showing a critical weakness. Since 
the Arab Spring movement ousted Hosni Mubarak in 2011, pipelines crossing the Sinai 
were attacked 27 times.104 It seems militant-borne disruptions are likely to continue given 
ISIS-affiliated Egyptian jihadist group Ansar Bayt Al-Maqdis continues to attack the 
pipeline despite a continuing crackdown against Islamists by Egyptian President Abdel 
Fattah el-Sisi’s administration.105 Despite Egypt’s security efforts, the pipeline has 
reportedly failed to deliver any natural gas to Jordan since July 2013 leaving the kingdom 
to rely on the aforementioned import of refined heavy fuel oils at nearly six times the cost 
of natural gas.106 Moreover, below-market energy exports, state energy subsidies, and 
slowed investment in exploration and development in the wake of the 2011 revolution 
left Jordan with a burgeoning state deficit and growing internal energy demand without 
sufficient domestic resources.107 The impact of pipeline attacks and Egypt’s rising 
domestic energy concerns have forced Jordan to seek alternatives to its natural gas 
imports from the Arab republic. 
Overcoming reliance on Egypt and misplaced optimism of domestic expansion, 
Jordan seeks to diversify its resources by looking to other nations. To this end, Jordan has 
spent $65 million to refit its port at Aqaba with the necessary infrastructure to import 
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ship-laden Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG).108 The LNG terminal opens Jordan’s import to 
LNG exporters across the world. Jordan’s Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resource 
officials claim this measure will help the country cut half-a-billion dollars from its annual 
energy bill.109 Nearby Qatar—the world’s leading LNG exporter since 2006—offers the 
best option.110 Since no pipeline infrastructure currently exists to transport natural gas 
between Jordan and Qatar, seaborne transfer of LNG is currently the most cost-effective 
means to transfer natural gas between the two countries. While LNG is typically one of 
the more expensive forms of energy, Qatar has been known to give price breaks to fellow 
Arab countries.111 In May 2015, the first LNG shipment occurred between Jordan’s 
National Electric Power Company and Qatargas—a Qatar Petroleum and Shell Global 
joint venture—via the Golar Eskimo—a Floating Storage and Regasification Unit.112 The 
Golar Eskimo will remain moored at Aqaba to facilitate the daily import of 150 million 
cubic feet of LNG based on a five-year agreement with Shell Global.113 Thus, Jordan’s 
efforts to open Aqaba to ship-laden LNG offer the country more flexibility and are a 
welcomed effort to diversify the countries energy import portfolio to displace reliance on 
even more expensive refined petroleum products. 
Recently discovered natural gas fields beneath Israeli controlled waters offer a 
practical, if politically contentious, alternative to Egyptian or Qatari natural gas supplies. 
Once also heavily dependent on foreign supplies from Egypt, the 26 trillion cubic feet of 
natural gas in the Tamar and Leviathan natural gas fields promise to bring Israel greater 
energy security with enough surplus for export.114 In turn, parties signed a deal wherein 
Israel will export 1.6 trillion cubic feet of natural gas to Jordan over a 15-year period 
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beginning in 2017. Thus, Israel would supply Jordan with a daily amount of 290 million 
cubic feet of gas—exceeding the 250 million feet of gas formerly supplied by Egypt and 
setting Israel up to become Jordan’s primary source of energy.115 Despite promising to 
save the country around $250 million per year, the contract—signed by private American 
developer Noble Energy and the Jordanian state-owned National Electric Power 
Company—has been widely opposed by Jordanian citizens.116 Palestinians make up a 
significant portion of Jordan’s population and many of them perceive Israel’s claims on 
natural gas as an illegitimate effort to take Palestinian natural resources. Sympathy for 
those in the Palestinian Territories also leaves many Jordanians feeling as though the 
energy deal would be providing the financial means for Israel to continue hard-nosed 
actions against their fellow Arabs. These popular efforts drove Jordan’s parliament to 
pass a decree opposing the agreement to purchase Israeli gas from Noble Energy in late 
in 2014. Despite this non-binding legislative outcry, King Abdullah II’s administration 
has pressed forward with the deal to import natural gas from Israel.117 
H. FINDINGS 
While Jordan’s economy has long been reliant on hydrocarbon imports, the 
inherent potential for supply disruptions and price shocks call the kingdom to seek further 
diversification of its energy sources. With the realm of fossil fuels, the Ministry of 
Energy and Mineral Resources were overly optimistic on the reliability of natural gas 
supplies from Egypt and the potential to expand and develop domestic energy sources—
including conventional oil, oil shale, and natural gas. Moreover, existing oil infrastructure 
still requires significant expansion and refurbishment to keep up with the kingdom’s 
growing energy demands. Despite the shock of disruptions in natural gas supplies from 
Egypt, Jordan is slowly—if somewhat unwillingly—adapting to seek new sources of 
natural gas from Israel while opening itself to the world market through its LNG 
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terminal. Considering the sustained low price and relatively low emissions of natural gas, 
this is a move in the right direction. Still, the kingdom must avoid the pitfall of relying on 
only a couple sources of energy. Diversification is key. In the next chapter, we will 




III. NUCLEAR ENERGY 
A. OVERVIEW 
 Understanding that diversification is key to making headway in energy security, 
the Jordanian Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources made development of domestic 
nuclear power a priority in the Updated Master Strategy of Energy Sector in Jordan for 
the period (2007–2020). Jordan’s nascent nuclear program may provide a means for 
indigenous power production, but multiple unsolved problems facing the drive toward 
nuclear power threaten to further endanger the kingdom. In this chapter, I contend that 
while the development of nuclear power could be a boon for addressing Jordan’s energy 
shortage, the current environment is not conducive to development in this area due to 
operational issues and political contention. Operational issues include a severe water 
shortage, disputes over the location of proposed nuclear power facilities, the challenge of 
dealing with atomic waste, allocating financing, and acquiring fissile material. 
International and domestic political opposition is another major sticking point that the 
administration cannot afford to overlook.  
B. AMBITIONS 
The opacity of nuclear energy development was obvious in the administration’s 
energy strategy. After all, the strategy discusses nuclear power only to a limited extent 
with no clear path forward. First, the strategy calls for further investigation into the 
development of domestic nuclear energy technology to act as an alternative for meeting 
the kingdom’s expected expansion of electricity demands.118 Second, the strategy 
provides a limited cost analysis comparing estimates for nuclear energy with heavy fuel 
oils and oil shale electricity generation—concluding that oil shale power generation 
would be the most frugal means of generating electricity in the near term considering the 
relatively high costs of nuclear fuel development and plant construction.119 Despite these 
costs, Jordan’s energy strategy called for the country to introduce nuclear power into the 
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future energy mix—both to address vulnerabilities in the kingdom’s energy security 
posture through diversification and deal with the related longstanding energy deficit. To 
this end, the strategy called for establishing a 60-megawatt nuclear power plant by 2020 
that would account for an estimated 6% of the national energy demand in that year.120 In 
the midst of these studies, Jordan founded the Committee for Nuclear Strategy—a short-
term entity that established a separate overarching goal targeted at achieving 30% of the 
country’s electric power generation by 2030 with the additional hope that Jordan can 
export excess electricity. Accordingly, the longer-term Jordan Atomic Energy 
Commission and Jordan Nuclear Regulatory Commission were set up to promote and 
regulate the potentiality of nuclear power going into the future.121 Jordan’s nuclear 
strategy was oriented toward achieving energy security, building partnerships, promoting 
technology transfer, utilizing domestic fissionable material, and providing reliable energy 
for desalination to address water scarcity.122 Jordan’s core energy strategy did not 
provide a road map or recommendations to direct policy toward this end. We need to 
consider the challenges facing Jordan’s nuclear energy development along with the 
breadth of proposed solutions arising from outside the framework of Jordan’s 2007 
energy strategy.  
C. WATER SCARCITY 
One of the foremost of Jordan’s technical challenges is the country’s 
overwhelming water shortage—with an estimated deficit of around 600 million cubic 
meters per year.123 Indeed, the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan proclaims, “the gravest 
environmental challenge that Jordan faces today is the scarcity of water.”124 In Jordan, 
renewable freshwater resources are limited to just 106 cubic meters per person, much 
                                                 
120 Ibid., 13–14. 
121 “Nuclear Power in Jordan,” World Nuclear Association, March 2015, http://www.world-
nuclear.org/info/Country-Profiles/Countries-G-N/Jordan/. 
122 “Nuclear Strategy,” Jordan Atomic Energy Commission, 2011, 
http://www.jaec.gov.jo/JordanNuclearProgram/NuclearStrategy.aspx. 
123 “Nuclear Power in Jordan.” 
124 “Jordan’s Water Shortage,” The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, accessed May 5, 2015, 
http://www.kinghussein.gov.jo/geo_env4.html. 
 33
lower than the 8,914 cubic meters per person experienced in the United States or even the 
1,053 cubic meters per person in neighboring Iraq.125 While the application of nuclear 
power for efforts to expand the prevalence of clean water through desalination is a 
centrally cited intent of Jordan’s Atomic Energy Commission, the country still needs to 
access a water source with enough capacity to cool the reactors.126 Due to water theft, 
leakage, and inefficient agricultural pursuits, Jordan’s groundwater is being utilized at an 
unsustainable rate. This use is estimated to outpace the refresh of aquifers exhausting 
over a third of these resources over the next 20 years.127 The Dead Sea is falling at over a 
meter per year, putting significant risk to the damage and loss of its unique high-salinity 
ecosystem and Jordan’s domestic mineral extraction efforts from that region.128 The Red 
Sea surrounding the Port of Aqaba provides the country a viable option to source water, 
but a parallel desalination plant would have to be built to provide the volume of demand 
needed without creating a long-term water deficit. Looking ahead, population growth, 
climate change, and regional conflict are apt to intensify challenge of supplying fresh, 
clean water for the Jordanian society and economy.129 
Water shortage is a shared problem among Middle East nations, making it a prime 
necessity for regional coordination and a potential area for bolstering economic 
interdependence. In early 2015, Jordan struck a deal with Israel to build a desalination 
plant at Aqaba. The plant will be funded by the World Bank and is estimated to cost 
approximately $900 million. Scheduled for completion in three years, the desalination 
plant is expected to put out approximately 80 million cubic meters of freshwater on an 
annual basis with Israel buying 40 million cubic meters of water at cost and Jordan 
retaining the remainder. In exchange, Israel would release an additional 50 million cubic 
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meters of water from the Sea of Galilee to Jordan via pipeline each year. The project also 
includes the construction of the Red Sea to Dead Sea water conveyor—a pipeline 
between the two seas depicted in Figure 3—to help recharge the Dead Sea and dispose of 
brine from the proposed desalination plant at Aqaba. This pipeline will initially pump 
300 million cubic meters per year and may be expanded to as much as two billion cubic 
meters with the addition of future projects. Pursuing partnerships like this with 
neighboring Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Iraq could help relieve future conflicts over water 
and strengthen ties through trade.130 Though—as we will discuss later—Jordan’s efforts 
toward nuclear energy threaten to unravel the significant progress in addressing water 
scarcity. 
Figure 3.  Red Sea to Dead Sea Conveyor 
 
Source: Harriet Sherwood, “Dead Sea Neighbours Agree to Pipeline to Pump Water from 
Red Sea,” The Guardian, December 9, 2013, sec. World news, 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/dec/09/dead-sea-pipeline-water-red-sea.  
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D. PLANT LOCATION 
Given its scarcity, water woes and other environmental factors have forced the 
Jordan Atomic Energy Commission to shift the proposed location of its plants. Early 
efforts were focused on building a plant on the southern coastline near Aqaba due to that 
area’s ready access to seawater; however, the port lies over a fault line extending through 
the Jordan Rift Valley. While the Jordan Atomic Energy Commission initially cited Japan 
as an example of earthquake safe nuclear technology, the 2011 Fukushima Daiichi 
nuclear disaster has forced them to reconsider. Jordan has since focused efforts at placing 
its first and largest proposed plant near the historical site of Qasr Amra using wastewater 
from the urban area surrounding Amman to cool the reactors.131 
E. WASTE DISPOSAL AND STORAGE 
Nuclear waste storage and disposal is another major issue often overlooked by 
countries with budding nuclear programs. Jordan recognizes the importance of waste 
storage and partnered with U.S. Department of Energy to construct a 4000-square-foot 
low and intermediate level radioactive storage site on the outskirts of Amman to 
safeguard minimal radioactive waste. Though, this facility would not come close to 
meeting the demands of a nuclear power program being constructed to address the 
improper storage of nuclear waste associated with byproducts of healthcare and academic 
pursuits. 132  
Storage and waste disposal provides another potential area for economic 
cooperation. With many Middle East nations seeking nuclear power—including Saudi 
Arabia, United Arab Emirates, and Egypt—it makes sense to create a regional site for 
securing and storing atomic waste.133 Israel has pursued both domestic storage of Israeli-
enriched materials at Dimona and return of U.S.-provided materials to nuclear storage 
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sites in America.134 The United Arab Emirates is pursuing a “dual track” initiative 
wherein used nuclear fuels will be stored domestically in reactor ponds or dry storage 
while exporting certain fuel for reprocessing outside the country. The Emirates is also 
looking into options for a geological waste depot as part of efforts to find a place for 
long-term storage of atomic waste in the region.135 Of course, such an effort would 
necessitate the rise of a cooperative Middle East security construct to counter local 
threats and provide a framework for securing stored nuclear waste in the region. 
F. FINANCIAL CHALLENGES 
Fiscal concerns have been a reoccurring factor causing Jordan to reorient its 
strategy. Jordan’s posture for building nuclear power plants has shifted from four plants 
at nearly $40 billion to one plant at $10 billion. These numbers are of significant 
relevance to Jordan considering the country’s Gross Domestic Product was only 
$36.55 billion in 2014.136 Meanwhile missed deadlines and other contractual issues 
forced Jordan to shift from deals with Areva to consider deals with companies from 
South Korea, Russia, Japan, China, and another French company. It seems Jordan might 
have had a breakthrough in March 2015, signing a deal with Russian state company 
Rosatom toward constructing a dual reactor 2,000-megawatt plant near Qasr Amra by 
2022. Through this deal, the Russians will build and operate the plant while providing 
49.9% of the financing. Jordan will be responsible for funding the majority stake of 
50.1%.137 While certainly a financial challenge, the investment seems prudent 
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considering Jordan’s hydrocarbon dependence was costing approximately $3 billion 
annually due to disruption of discounted hydrocarbon supplies from Iraq and Egypt.138  
G. NUCLEAR FUEL 
Exploiting Jordan’s domestic uranium reserves have been looked at as a means of 
providing domestic finances. Figure 4 shows the most concentrated areas of Gamma 
radiation outlining locations of concentrated uranium deposits. Estimates of Jordan’s 
uranium reserves are placed at around 140,000 tons of economically extractable material 
with another 50,000 tons of material embedded within phosphate deposits, which are 
more costly and difficult to mine.139 While uranium traded for $39.4 per pound in March 
2014, prices on the rare earth commodity reached a high of $135 per pound at the peak of 
the 2007 uranium market bubble. By 2008, the Kingdom of Jordan and French energy 
company Areva Incorporated initiated talks for extraction and processing of Jordan’s 
domestic uranium deposits with the hope that revenue from extraction could 
independently finance Jordan’s nuclear program. This agreement progressed to the 
establishment of a joint French-Jordanian corporation between Areva and Jordan Energy 
Resources Incorporated—a state owned company overseen by the Jordanian Atomic 
Energy Commission—entitled Jordan French Uranium Mining Company. Drilling nearly 
10,000 core samples, the company began its efforts within a 100 square kilometer area 
and found high quality uranium at around 400 parts per million.140 In total, the joint 
venture was able to identify 20,000 tons of uranium concentrated within central Jordan 
and a more focused extraction study was to be completed by 2012 so that mining could 
start in 2015. Yet, Jordan terminated the contract. Allegedly this was on the grounds that 
Areva failed to submit a report in a timely manner. Areva maintains that they were only 
responsible for prospecting and that another contract was needed to carry out feasibility 
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studies and conduct extraction operations. Regardless, Jordan still needs a means of 
enriching its domestic uranium and internal enrichment motives are serious points of 
controversy internationally.141  
Figure 4.  Gamma Radiation Map 
 
“Jordan countrywide Gamma intensity airborne survey, showing areas of high radiation. 
Known phosphate areas are outlined in black areas with uranium anomalies are outlined 
in red, and one area with thorium anomalies is outlined in gray.” From: Ned Xoubi, 
“Evaluation of Uranium Concentration in Soil Samples of Central Jordan,” Minerals 5, 
no. 2 (March 25, 2015): 134.  
To alleviate concerns over Jordan’s pursuit of enrichment and maintain regional 
stability Jordan needs to forego its enrichment pursuits. While the prospect of enrichment 
could bring Jordan more energy independence, it places Jordan at odds with Israel, 
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delegitimizes U.S. nuclear negotiations with Tehran, and sets a poor precedent 
encouraging actions that could lead to proliferation of nuclear weapons. Jordan sees its 
national uranium reserves as a means to bring jobs and much needed revenue to its 
people. Uranium extraction efforts can continue, but with the understanding that 
enrichment will occur exogenously per current 123 agreement standards. The sovereign 
right to the enrich touted by Jordan must be overcome by encouraging established foreign 
sources of enrichment—which diminishes potential for weapon grade material and 
encourages peaceful trade. Progress in the United Arab Emirates nuclear program 
provides a recent example of how agreeing to discontinue enrichment pursuits can speed 
the path to nuclear power.142 Thus, it seems foregoing enrichment can build international 
support and help Jordan focus more on the core issue of providing power to its struggling 
domestic economy. 
H. POLITICAL CONTENTION 
Many operational problems have contributed to political antagonism within the 
discourse of nuclear discussion. Given the west’s current economic sanctions against 
Russia and the prevalence of conflict in the Middle East, it is no wonder that there is 
some international reluctance to support the joint Jordanian-Russian bid for a nuclear 
power plant. From an international perspective, analysts at the Washington Institute 
highlight the vocal political opposition from both the United States and Israel.143 Despite 
their relative peace and cooperation since the 1994 Treaty of Peace Between the State of 
Israel and the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, Israel, King Abdullah made claims that 
Israel was pressuring Jordan’s potential nuclear business partners to stall during their 
negotiations. Israeli sources maintain that Israel has only supported Jordan’s efforts to 
build a nuclear power plant for peaceful purposes by providing geological data for the 
area surrounding Aqaba.144 Members of the U.S. Congress are concerned over the 
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potential for a nuclear power plant in Jordan to enlarge the regions Sunni-Shia rift and 
place Iran at greater odds with countries in the region. U.S. officials are also concerned 
over the region’s fragile security situation and abundance of extremist and terrorist 
organizations in light of expanding Islamic State influence in neighboring Iraq and 
Syria.145 Similar to ongoing negotiations with Iran, disagreement over the necessity and 
right to enrich fissile material has been a sticking point in Jordan’s nuclear program.146 
Domestically, its seems the high cost of nuclear power plants, potential for 
terrorist threats, environmental apprehensions, and safety concerns are among the major 
sticking points. Jordanians have conducted planned demonstrations against the proposed 
nuclear plants and parliament suspended progress on the plants in 2012. While many 
agree that Nuclear energy has the potential to help Jordan overcome some of its water 
and energy problems, there is a mass of domestic political rhetoric questioning the 
viability of a nuclear program in Jordan. For example a Jordanian environmental group 
argues that published budgetary estimates overlook insurance, loan interest, nuclear waste 
disposal, and the financial burden of retiring plants in later years. Members of Jordan’s 
parliament, like Atif Kawwar, Jamal Gammoh, and Hind al-Fayiz do not think nuclear 
power is right for Jordan. Kawwar thinks that oil shale, natural gas, and renewables 
would provide more immediate, cost-effective answers to Jordan’s energy needs, but the 
nuclear lobby is keeping them from happening. The Jordan Atomic Energy Commission 
has experienced its own internal points of contention between the current chairman, 
Khalid Toukan, and former commissioners of the nuclear fuel cycle and site selection. 
Originally charged with leading examination of the exploitability of domestic uranium 
reserves for the atomic fuel cycle, Nidal Xoubi voiced concern that concentration of the 
element within core samples was not high enough for economical extraction. The former 
commissioner of site management, Kamal Khudayr, left in disgust over plans to move the 
proposed nuclear plants location from the Gulf of Aqaba to Qusayr Amr. Some are also 
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concerned over seeming nepotism between the Jordan Atomic Energy Commission and 
the Jordan Nuclear Regulatory Commission given the newest director of the regulatory 
commission is the brother of one of the top five officials in the Jordan Atomic Energy 
Commission.147  
I. FINDINGS 
The resource constraints and political dynamics surrounding Jordan’s nuclear 
program are unfavorable to development of utility scale nuclear power employment. 
Without easy access to fissile material and the water necessary for cooling the nuclear 
reactor, it is unlikely that the country will be able to operationalize a utility scale nuclear 
project in the near term. Problems of nuclear waste storage and deepening safety 
concerns associated with the post-Fukushima environment compound the issues facing 
Jordan’s prospects for nuclear energy. Together, these and other issues have cemented 
political opposition to Jordan’s nuclear program at home and abroad. Jordan cannot act 
unilaterally. The path followed by Jordan’s administrators should make them keen to an 
important awareness—that Jordan does not have the requisite resources to act unilaterally 
toward obtaining nuclear power. Despite the potential nuclear power has for alleviating 
Jordan from its energy problems, development of this source will require the country to 
undertake international coordination and assistance to be seen through to fruition.  
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IV. RENEWABLE ENERGY 
A. OVERVIEW  
While the Kingdom of Jordan might not be experiencing the kind of 
transformational growth in nuclear energy laid out in the 2007 energy strategy document, 
the administration has had some success in attracting investment and development of its 
renewable energy sector. As discussed previously, Jordan was not geographically 
endowed with amounts of readily extractable oil and natural gas reserves with which to 
supply its domestic energy market. On the other hand, Jordan was endowed with a wealth 
of renewable energy that is poised to avail Jordan of some of its energy woes. The 
purpose of this chapter is to establish Jordan’s progress toward meeting its goals in the 
renewable energy sector and analyze whether its achievements in this area are likely to 
contribute to energy security. I do not contend that these green energy resources can 
immediately solve all the country’s problems. Rather, I argue that Jordan has significant 
untapped resources that can augment and diversify Jordan’s energy portfolio while 
reducing the likelihood of adverse environmental risks–particularly the loss or misuse of 
scarce and precious water resources. Through the course of this section I will present the 
varied sources of renewable energy and their applicability to Jordan’s energy challenges 
by highlighting the related strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats for sources of 
renewable energy applicable to Jordan. Within the following body of text, I illustrate the 
characteristics of hydro, wind, solar, geothermal, and biological energies as well as 
discuss the institutional and infrastructural issues pertaining to renewables in Jordan. 
B. AMBITIONS 
Before we delve into these sources, however, it is important to provide context by 
highlighting Jordan’s established goals for the renewable energy sector. In the Ministry 
of Energy and Mineral Resources’ Updated Master Strategy of Energy Sector for the 
Period (2007–2020), the administration set progressive goals to increase the amount of 
domestic renewable power sources within its largely foreign hydrocarbon-based energy 
sector. At the time this strategy was published, in 2007, domestic renewable sources 
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accounted for only 1% of the demand for primary energy.148 Over the course of the 
development period, the Jordanian administration set goals to expand its employment of 
renewables in 2015 and 2020 to 7% and 10%, respectively.149 Thus, Jordan targeted a 
total of 1,800 megawatts from renewables by 2020. To meet these limited goals for 
expanding the renewable sector, the Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources put forth 
the following recommendations: issue legislation to encourage private investment and 
growth in the renewable energy sector; complete 600 megawatts of wind energy 
development by 2020 through proposed projects at Kamsha Fujaij, Harir, Wadi Araba, 
and other locations to be determined; study potential for employing 300 to 600 MW of 
solar energy; extend application of solar cells to rural lighting projects as well as multi-
use electricity generation; construct a waste-to-energy power plant; consider use of 
biofuels for displacing use of petroleum-based fuels in transport and industry; and form a 
renewable energy projects fund to encourage research and investment in renewable 
energy.150  
Accounting for the relatively high cost of renewable energy projects, hope for 
speedy nuclear development, confidence in domestic hydrocarbon development, and the 
fact that Jordan was receiving discounted natural gas from Egypt at the time the 
document was published supports a strategy of minimal investment in renewable 
resources. Jordan formed its strategy on the notion that discounted natural gas supplies 
from Egypt would continue and perhaps even increase in volume.151 After all, the 
kingdom could not foresee the disruptions and shortages associated with the Arab Spring 
and more recent surge of Islamist violence in the region. Reconsidering Jordan’s 
domestic renewable energy resources in light of these changes offers some means to 
overcome the country’s energy challenges. 
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When Jordan’s energy strategists planned their way ahead, they envisaged wind-
based power accounting for the majority of Jordan’s renewable energy and it is easy to 
see why. Certain parts of the country are endowed with high-rated regular wind speeds 
from 15 to 25 miles per hour.152 These areas—concentrated in the northern and western 
parts of the country as depicted in Figure 5—have been the primary targets for future 
wind farms. Jordan’s pre-existing wind power was developed for research in the mid to 
late 1980s and summed to just under 1.45 megawatts between the pilot sites at Hofa  
and Al-Ibrahimiyya north of Amman.153 Within Jordan’s strategy document, six  
specific sites were recommended for development: a 30–40 megawatt project at Kamsha, 
a 60–70 megawatt project at Fujaij, a 100–200 megawatt project at Harir, and a  
40–50 megawatt project at Wadi Araba. The 2007 strategy called for an additional 300 
megawatts of wind energy development at locations that were to be determined by future 
survey and analysis.154 By 2012, the Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources 
expanded obligations for wind power by increasing goals two-fold in hopes of reaching 
1200 megawatts of wind energy capacity by 2020–which would account for two-thirds of 
that year’s projected renewable sector.155 
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Figure 5.  Jordan Wind Resource Map.  
 
Adapted from: “Jordan Wind Resource Map,” Vortex, accessed November 2, 2015, 
http://www.vortexfdc.com/jordan-wind-map/. 
Progress toward 2020 wind energy goals and recommendations are mixed. 
Initially due to come online in 2010, development of the Kamsha site was poised to  
be Jordan’s first utility-scale wind farm. Unfortunately, concerns over noise abatement 
along with extended price negotiations with the Terna Energy-led Greek-Jordanian 
consortium—which sought to build the wind farm on a buy, own, and operate model—
have stalled progress on the site.156 The Harir site experienced an even worse fate—being 
cancelled along with other proposed renewable energy production locations due to 
rejection from the Gulf Cooperation Council for a grant to improve grid infrastructure 
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needed to integrate the site.157 On the other hand, the Wadi Araba wind power 
development site was open for bids as of January 2015.158 Having the only significant 
progress among the ministry’s original list of locations, the Fujajj site was awarded to 
Korea Electric Power on buy, own, and operate model through a 2010 tender. In July of 
2015, the government approved plans for this South Korean company to break ground on 
an expanded proposal to bring 90 megawatts of wind turbines online by 2019.159  
Moving beyond the ministry’s original site recommendations, wind energy 
developments driven by private enterprise have made more significant progress. In July 
2015, Jordan approved four projects from companies that made direct proposals through 
a process enabled by legislation from 2012. Set to come online by 2019, the approved 
projects include 226 megawatts of capacity spread across plants near Al-Rajef, Tafilah, 
and Al-Ibrahimiyya. Each company proposed a build, own, and operate model—
submitting bids at the government’s wind energy price ceiling of 11 cents per kilowatt-
hour. Jordan made significant progress toward harnessing the power of its winds, but the 
administration will need to work quickly if it wants to reach the increased capacity of 
1200 megawatts by 2020. Keeping feed-in tariff limits high could attract investors need 
to reach this goal, but falling costs due to competitiveness of photovoltaic cells discussed 
in the following section are likely to drive feed-in tariffs downward in future 
negotiations—perhaps necessitating a greater focus on development of solar farms.160 
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While being largely overlooked in the 2007 energy strategy due to high relative 
costs, the abundance of solar irradiation in Jordan offers a promising opportunity to meet 
the kingdom’s growing energy needs. After all, the Ministry of Energy and Mineral 
Resources’ 2007 energy strategy simply recommended future studies to consider 
developing between 300 and 600 megawatts of solar energy before 2020.161 Completing 
a countrywide study to consider expansion of solar assets early in the strategy’s period of 
focus, the ministry discovered that areas in the south of the country held the best 
opportunity for future solar power developments.162 Having over 300 days of sunny skies 
per year combined with an average daily solar irradiance of between five and seven 
kilowatts per hour for every square meter makes Jordan one of the world’s most abundant 
country’s in terms of solar potential.163 Figure 6 shows varying, yet relatively high 
concentration of solar irradiation throughout the country. This prevalence of solar 
resources in Jordan could be leveraged to surpass the country’s 2020 benchmark of using 
renewables to fulfill 10% of total energy demand—projected to be 1800 megawatts.164 
Off-grid power applications historically dominated the photovoltaic sector—being 
targeted toward efforts intended to provide limited electricity, heating, and water 
pumping in rural areas.165 As of 2012, Jordan only had 1.6 megawatts of installed 
photovoltaic capacity in these various applications.166 Though, falling photovoltaic prices 
combined with efforts of the Jordan’s administration seem to have challenged this 
precedent. 
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Figure 6.  Solar Irradiation 
  
Source: “Direct Normal Irradiation Jordan,” SolarGIS, 2015, 
http://solargis.info/doc/_pics/freemaps/1000px/dni/SolarGIS-Solar-map-DNI-Jordan-
en.png. 
The solar budgetary assumptions underlying Jordan’s original energy strategy 
have vastly shifted in the country’s favor due to recent advancements in technology that 
enhance operational efficiency and cost effectiveness of photovoltaic systems. Solar costs 
in the Middle East are nearly 75% cheaper in 2015 than they were when bureaucrats in 
the Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources formulated the strategy in 2007.167 These 
falling costs helped encourage investment and construction of 212 megawatts of 
photovoltaic capacity completed in 2014.168 In light of these changes, the ministry seems 
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to have shifted its stance toward photovoltaic generation making solar power a greater 
priority in the energy portfolio by issuing two tender programs for would be developers. 
In the first round of tenders completed in February 2014, Jordan signed power purchase 
agreements for a dozen projects summing to 200 megawatts of solar power. In a second 
round completed in May 2015, Jordan secured power purchase agreements for another 
200 megawatts of solar energy capacity with four companies and 20-year fixed feed in 
tariffs set at record low photovoltaic prices ranging from 6.13 U.S. cents per kilowatt-
hour and 7.67 U.S. cents per kilowatt-hour. The record-low prices are no doubt due to 
recent and projected advancements in the photovoltaic industry. These agreements 
represent the kind of falling cost burden that could bring solar energy costs into parity 
with conventional energy sources to transform Jordan’s energy mix and surpass the initial 
strategy’s consideration for 600 megawatts of solar photovoltaic capacity by 2020.169 
E. HYDRO 
Jordan’s strategy did not provide out specific measures for harnessing 
hydropower. Considering the environmental and ecological impacts of hydropower, it is 
debatable whether it should be considered a renewable energy resource. Yet, it provides 
power without creating direct carbon emissions and upstream water supply is typically 
replenished in the earth’s annual water cycle. Hydropower is considered here because the 
potential for expanding hydroelectricity it not significant enough to warrant extensive 
analysis of this energy source in the form of a separate chapter. Considering a relative 
lack of regularly flowing waterways, Jordan was foregone the opportunity for mass 
hydropower projects that have helped many countries attain affordable, reliable sources 
of electricity to power their economies. As one of the four poorest countries in terms of 
freshwater resources, Jordan does not have a plethora of flowing tributaries to support 
expanding power production efforts.170  
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Yet, hydropower comprised the foremost installed form of domestic, non-carbon-
emitting energy during Jordan’s status as an independent country. Hydropower accounts 
for just over 60,000 Megawatt hours of annual electricity and accounted for less than 
one-half of one percent of the country’s total energy production in recent years. This 
power source provided 10 megawatts of renewable capacity in 2012—offering just over 
60% of the installed renewable capacity when considered as part of the renewable 
portfolio.171 Spanning the Zarqa River in northern Jordan since 1978, the King Talal 
Dam produces the nation’s main source of conventional hydroelectricity—providing 
approximately 25,000 Megawatt hours of power per year.172 Other sources of 
hydroelectricity are limited and can be characterized as efficiency gaining systems from 
larger existing or planned projects. Examples of projects include turbines installed to 
generate power from elevation drops in water transport systems. One example is the six 
megawatt turbines installed on lines transporting seawater used for cooling the fossil-fuel 
burning Aqaba Power Station. Another is the potential for 400 and 800 megawatts of 
power to take advantage of the elevation difference between the Red Sea and Dead Sea in 
the proposed Red Sea to Dead Sea Conveyor depicted in Figure 3.173 Despite these 
efficiency-gaining measures hydropower is expected to play a miniscule role in Jordan’s 
future energy mix approaching the end of the strategy’s target period in 2020.174 
F. BIOENERGY 
Given Jordan’s shortage of readily available water resources and related relatively 
low share of arable land—which covers only 2% of the small country—leaves Jordan 
without much potential for conventional biomass utilization.175 Jordan has neither the 
sprawling plantations nor the vast forests characteristic of countries that make significant 
use of biomass. Rather, the little available land has been employed to offset the 
kingdom’s high proportion of food imports. Therefore, the Ministry of Mineral and 
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Energy Resources did not consider strict agriculturally based biomass a viable pursuit for 
expanding the countries energy capacity to meet rising demands. 
Yet, there may be a benefit to Jordan’s growing population and its rising 
demands. Jordan’s growing population may place strains on the economy, but it also 
creates municipal waste. This waste along with organic residuals of Jordan’s industrial 
and limited agricultural output can be leveraged in waste-to-energy production to help 
offset the rising demand for energy. Thus, Jordan made both installation of 20 to 
30 megawatts of municipal waste power capacity and exploration of biogas development 
priorities in its 2007 to 2020 energy plans.176 Prior to the strategy, a single pilot plant 
existed outside Amman at Rusaifeh Landfill that was expanded to four megawatts in 
2008.177 By 2012, biomass made up just over 21% of the Hashemite Kingdom’s 
renewable energy capacity at 10 megawatts.178  
Compared to other renewable sources, the Ministry of Energy and Mineral 
Resources seems to have received less private interest in expanding bioenergy 
production. Instead, the central government seems to be relying on decentralized efforts 
of its major cities and twelve governorates—typified by the proposed Greater Amman 
Municipality Solid Waste Project at the Al Ghabawi landfill—to fill the bioenergy gap in 
moving toward the 2020 milestones.179 Of course, such projects have the added benefit of 
managing the mounting abundance of waste piling up in the small country’s landfills and 
partially offset hydrocarbon imports.180 Yet, the lack of substantial development since the 
implementation of ministry’s energy strategy in 2007 suggest that a poor regulatory 
framework surrounding waste management as well as ceiling tariffs on biomass and 
biogas—set at 12.7 U.S. cents per kilowatt hour and 8.5 U.S. cents per kilowatt hour, 
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respectively—are not incentivizing enough action or investment in bioenergy production 
ventures.181 To better enable bioenergy extraction, municipalities may need to move 
away from having several highly dispersed landfill sites to fewer sites that can allow 
bioenergy developers to take advantage of higher economies of scale.182 
G. GEOTHERMAL 
Jordan possesses an abundance of geothermal resources spread throughout the 
country. These assets are most abundant in the Jordan Rift Valley in the west and the 
country’s eastern plateau. Unfortunately, known geothermal resources are characterized 
as low in heat with energy too low to merit exploitation in major power generation.183 
Even if any geothermal electricity were generated, prices would be capped at 12 U.S. 
cents per kilowatt hour since such electricity would fall under the miscellaneous 
renewable energy sources category as laid out in Jordan’s existing tariff framework.184 
Thus, there is low potential for using geothermal resources outside of limited agricultural 
and tourist applications. 
H. INSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT 
The development of new institutions—which the late Douglass North described as 
“the rules of the game in a society, or…the humanly devised constraints that shape 
human interaction”—has played a crucial role in enabling development in the renewables 
sector.185 Jordan’s growing renewable energy sector can largely be attributed to the 
policy guidance and regulatory framework laid out in the kingdom’s 2007 Master Energy 
Plan and Law Number 13 of 2012 entitled the Renewable Energy and Efficiency Law. 
On one hand, the Master Energy Plan provided overarching policy guidance driving the 
diversification of energy sources from its publishing in 2007 through the year 2020—
                                                 
181 “Renewable Energy Profile.” 
182 “Sustainable Energy Mix,” 102–103. 
183 Ibid., 103. 
184 “Renewable Energy Profile.” 
185 Douglass North, Institutions, Instutional Change and Economic Performance (Cambridge, UK: 
Cambridge University Press, 1990), 3. 
 54
with the stated intent of reducing the countries heavy dependency on foreign energy 
sources. On the other hand, the plan set specific milestones for the development of 
renewable resources at 7% for 2015 and 10% of total energy consumption for 2020.186 
Though, one can note that little progress was made toward these goals leading up to 
2012. Extending on the direction of the energy strategy, the Renewable Energy and 
Efficiency Law provides a specific framework to encourage investment and 
entrepreneurship in the renewable energy sector by establishing the National Energy 
Research Center to promote renewable energy and efficiency education, a fund to 
enhance awareness of savings potential among energy consumers in households and 
industry while lending technical and financial support to sector development, a means for 
renewable energy developers to deal directly with the Ministry of Energy, a requirement 
that the National Electric Power Company cover grid connection costs, and an obligation 
for this company to purchase any renewably-generated electricity produced by developers 
based on fixed feed-in tariffs.187 Seeing the hastened pace of advancement since the 
Renewable Energy and Efficiency Law was implemented illustrates how development of 
key institutions may help drive development elsewhere in the energy sector.188 
I. INFRASTRUCTURE 
Despite the hope renewable energy sources bring to dealing with the kingdom’s 
energy dilemma, Jordan needs major investment in grid infrastructure to absorb, 
transport, and store the output of this budding sector. Building power transmission lines 
is an acute problem facing Jordan’s recent developments. After all, the most lucrative 
projects in solar energy are located in the county’s south, distanced from the major 
northern population centers that could utilize solar energy to alleviate demands—
particularly during periods of peak use.189 As previously mentioned, the inability to 
integrate newly proposed projects due to a failure to secure funding for grid expansion 
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was advertised by the Ministry of Mineral of Energy and Mineral Resources as the 
principle reasons for cancelling the third round of renewable energy tenders introduced in 
February of 2014.190 Thus, the failure to obtain a grid improvement grant from the Gulf 
Cooperation Council forced Jordan to forgo some 400 megawatts of potential capacity.191 
Yet, Jordan is making inroads to constructing a grid expansion project referred to as the 
Green Corridor. In early 2015, Chinese green energy firm Hanergy agreed to grant 
$310 million to build up Jordan’s energy infrastructure and the Kingdom recently 
released a tender for construction that will allow the corridor to add 1,000 megawatts of 
grid capacity on top of the Kingdom’s current 3,700 megawatt grid.192 Thus, the 
administration seems to have learned to ensure capacity is available for renewable 
expansion and is working to accommodate future green energy projects. 
J. FINDINGS 
Clearly, renewable sources provide a readily available and sustainable means of 
fueling Jordan’s economy with the energy it needs to propel the country forward. In 
particular, the countries abundant wind and solar resources promise to enable a major 
shift in Jordan’s economy. After analysis, it is clear that neither hydropower nor 
geothermal sources are likely to be leveraged toward vast gains in utility scale energy 
production. Meanwhile, bioenergy delved from waste can help kill two birds with one 
stone—adding needed energy to the grid and absolving the country of its growing 
landfills. Overall, the Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources seemed reluctant to take 
the drastic measures needed to encourage growth in the renewable sector. Perhaps, the 
large energy gains from potential megaprojects in other sectors were viewed as being 
quick kills that could free Jordan from its energy woes in a more rapid and decisive 
manner. While the gains in individual renewable projects may seem small, they are 
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making real progress where developments in domestic shale and nuclear power have been 
unsatisfying. Moreover, the scale of the projects allows the administration to 
incrementally adapt to conditions. This adaptation was evident in both the country’s 
effort to expand infrastructure and its development of key institutions to encourage 
growth. The growth of renewables in Jordan may have fallen behind the administration’s 
2007 goals for the year 2020, but these sources are certainly progressing and growing in 
their share of the overall energy mix. Most importantly, these sources are providing the 
country with greater energy security—offering more domestic availability, providing 
greater diversification, and making the country less susceptible to the exogenous shocks 




A. SYNTHESIS  
Up to this point, the assorted aspects of Jordan’s varying energy sources have 
been considered. In this final chapter, we synthesize the conclusions of each of the 
preceding chapters. Synthesizing the findings of the previous chapters lends important 
evidence supporting the notion that the Jordanian administration has not been effective in 
seeing its energy strategy through to fruition. Analyzing the implications of Jordan’s 
energy strategy is tenuous for this reason. Despite their efforts, the bureaucracy in 
Amman has failed to meet all of the milestones set for 2015. What can be said is that in 
failing to complete these self-imposed objectives, ministerial personnel fell short of 
tackling what they deemed to be the Kingdom’s most important energy challenges. 
Moreover, the Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources has not adequately shifted 
strategy to adapt for ongoing changes in the energy landscape. By reviewing the three 
main findings presented up to this point, one can better consider the limited effectiveness 
of Jordan’s energy security efforts.  
First, Jordan has not been able to fully execute the recommendations provided in 
the realm of hydrocarbons. After all, the country was unable to fulfill the optimistic 
domestic oil, oil shale, and natural gas developments called for within the national energy 
strategy.193 Conversely, the kingdom succeeded in finding new diversification of natural 
gas sources by opening an LNG terminal at Aqaba and making a politically contentious 
deal to buy natural gas from Israeli-controlled gas fields.194 Thus, the kingdom is likely 
to continue heavy reliance on hydrocarbons—albeit from more varied sources.  
The second main point is that the fits and starts of Jordan’s nuclear program have 
been largely unfruitful and the outlook for future development is poor. Despite heavy 
administrative investment in atomic energy, the country has yet to see the construction of 
any utility scale plant. Furthermore, the prospects for such a plant are opposed from 
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segments of both the national and international community for varying reasons ranging 
from broad environmental concerns to acute concerns over safety and security.195  
Third, examination revealed the huge potential for the country’s nascent 
renewable energy development. Despite slow initial progress, the boom of wind and solar 
development projects in the wake of Jordan’s 2012 legislation pertaining to renewables 
showed the high potential for foreign direct investment in the wake of a supportive 
institutional framework. Conversely, the Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources 
turned investors away, which demonstrated that the ministry did not have the 
infrastructure or administrative capacity to realize the country’s full exploitation of 
renewable resources. Next, one must consider recommendations for future improvement. 
B. RECOMMENDATIONS 
There are several proposals that may be imparted from considering the country’s 
ongoing energy problems. First, one must consider the area of hydrocarbons that have 
long dominated Jordan’s energy portfolio. In the face of international energy market 
austerity, Jordan’s energy administrators pragmatically sought to make limited energy 
independence a priority, but Amman was overly optimistic in the development of 
domestic hydrocarbon resources. After all, none of the proposed areas for domestic 
exploitation efforts have translated to significant gains in production. Though, the 
kingdom’s success in establishing a liquefied natural gas terminal at Aqaba and 
progression on a natural gas deal with Israel provide a way forward. These 
interconnections offer Jordan a key characteristic to overcome exogenous shocks and 
disruptions—diversity. In light of the sustained lows in energy price markets, the shale 
revolution, and reintroduction of Iranian resources to the greater international market, it 
seems heavy reliance on fossil fuels is likely to persist for the near future.196 These 
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developments compound with what Daniel Yergin refers to as the “law of long lead 
times,” or the notion that a major shift away from hydrocarbons will take several years 
due to the deeply embedded nature of existing production capital, infrastructure, and 
consumer habits.197 Professor Robert Looney agreed, “The renewable technologies that 
are currently being deployed are highly unlikely to provide enough reliable and cheap 
energy to replace fossil fuels.”198 Though considering the Middle East’s current state of 
upheaval and Jordan’s history of vulnerability to supply disruption, the kingdom needs to 
emphasize both the employment of the various types of hydrocarbons and increased 
variety among the sources of those hydrocarbons. After all, past instances have shown 
that the threats of supply disruption can come in enumerable ways. Thus diversification 
will be key to overcoming unforeseen issues with hydrocarbon supplies. To this end, 
Jordan needs to make oil and natural gas pipeline interconnections with resource-rich 
neighboring countries a greater priority. The ongoing efforts to connect with Iraq’s oil 
infrastructure are a good, if militarily challenging, first step. Repairing or replacing the 
inoperable Trans-Arabian Pipeline is an important measure that can connect Jordan to 
Saudi Arabia’s plentiful oil reserves. In doing so, Amman can reduce the high transaction 
costs associated with shipping supplies into Aqaba and avoid overreliance on the 
hazardous trucking routes bringing supplies in from Iraq. Another lucrative measure 
would be seeking a natural gas pipeline across the Saudi kingdom into Qatar to connect 
to the Qatari’s massive offshore North Dome Gas Field. While these measures would 
surely be beneficial to Jordan, they also bring hydrocarbon supplies from resource 
extracting countries closer to budding energy transport hub offered in Turkey. 
Connecting to pipelines in Turkey could enable access to the European market, reduce 
transaction costs from shipping, make resource allocation more efficient, and enhance 
energy security for the global market. Moreover, the potentiality of these connections 
could provide Jordan with further economic input through transit fees and much needed 
jobs for those residing within the kingdom. Of course, seeing throughput to Turkey and 
greater Europe will necessitate genuine security cooperation to mitigate threats from the 
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region’s disparate security threats. Ultimately, the difficulty in stopping these threats 
underlines the fact that the most important thing Jordan can do from the standpoint of 
hydrocarbons is avoiding the troublesome reliance on any one source. 
Considering the many challenges facing Jordan’s nuclear program, it is 
questionable whether nuclear power is a viable option for the country at this time. 
Perhaps the best option to pursue nuclear power would be greater cooperation with the 
United States. A greater degree of U.S. involvement with Jordan’s nuclear program can 
help the beleaguered nation resolve several of its core issues. By agreeing to renounce 
enrichment and reprocessing of uranium, Jordan could ease international and domestic 
concern over the country’s nuclear intentions. Without the ability to enrich or reprocess 
fuels, the country would not be able to independently pursue nuclear weapons. The 
current Jordan-Russia deal threatens to strategically bind Jordan to Russia in the midst of 
the West’s tenuous relations with Russia. Instead of pursuing business with Russia, 
Jordan needs to follow the standard set with the United States-United Arab Emirates 
Agreement for Peaceful Civilian Nuclear Energy Cooperation. In doing so, the U.S. could 
afford Jordan access to technology, training, radiological material, and waste 
management needed to bring the country’s nuclear program to fruition. The high stakes 
of Jordanian energy security necessitate vast development and diversification into 
alternative fuel sources. Nuclear power can reduce the reliance on hydrocarbons 
threatening the economic vitality and political legitimacy of the U.S.-friendly Hashemite 
regime. Thus, pursuit of a 1-2-3 Agreement for Peaceful Cooperation is a crucial step 
toward fulfilling Jordan’s nuclear energy objective, gaining greater energy security, and 
reinforcing the stability of a key U.S. ally.199 
Jordan’s solar and wind characteristics offer great potential for future domestic 
energy development, but the administration needs to solve some important issues to 
exploit these resources. An updated strategic policy-guidance document could help 
institute a greater bureaucratic commitment to this end. The institutional development 
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embodied in Jordan’s 2012 Renewable Energy and Efficiency Legislation and the 
pursuant surge in development projects shows how institutional change can stimulate 
development in the sector.200 A lot has changed since the strategy was formulated in 
2007, and officially reorienting the strategy through an update could help Jordan’s 
administrators steer the country toward greater employment of wind and solar resources 
by raising the goals for renewable development and abandoning efforts that have proved 
less fruitful. Of course, the surge in renewable energy bids also illustrated the limitations 
of Jordan’s electricity grid and the inadequate administrative capacity of the Ministry of 
Energy and Mineral Resources.201 Jordan is in the process of updating its grid for 
projects currently in the pipeline, but the infrastructure will need further expansion to 
accommodate a greater share of renewable energy.202 As with hydrocarbons, seeking grid 
interconnectedness with neighbors in the long-term would provide greater regional 
energy security and could offer the distant potential to export green energy to high 
demand markets—which is related in the DESERTEC concept for employing renewable 
energy from the world’s deserts on a massive scale.203 
Ultimately, there are innumerable paths for Jordan to consider in its energy future. 
Despite some of the shortcomings highlighted in this text, the aforementioned 
recommendations illustrate that the country has many potential areas for improvement. 
Leveraging these opportunities and mitigating threats to the kingdom’s energy needs is 
likely to remain an important issue for the foreseeable future. In doing so, the Hashemite 
Kingdom of Jordan must remain attuned to the international political and economic 
environment. As challenging as the continual adaptation to changes in shifting markets 
and politics may be, the Jordanian people’s resilience in the face of austerity shows they 
are up to the task. 
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